Lessons from Everest: Cognitive Bias, Psychological Safety, and System Complexity

by Michael Roberto


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Fall 2002

Volume 45
Issue 1


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Abstract

Many participants and observers have analyzed the 1996 Mount Everest tragedy and blamed a host of factors including the weather, equipment failures, and human error. This article examines the people and events through three theoretical lenses: behavioral decision theory, group dynamics, and complex systems. Factors at each level-individual, group, and organizational system-interacted with one another to cause the tragedy. This analysis provides a framework for understanding and diagnosing large-scale organizational failures, and it provides several important lessons for managers making and implementing high-stakes decisions within organizations.

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