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California Management Review
California Management Review is a premier academic management journal published at UC Berkeley
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Article Information
Are Syndicates the Killer App of Equity Crowdfunding?
Agrawal, Ajay , Christian Catalini, and Avi Goldfarb
58
/
2
(
Winter
2016
):
111
-
124
Information asymmetry presents a challenge to equity crowdfunding just as in other markets for equity capital. Investors are less likely to finance startups when it is difficult to assess quality. Syndicates reduce market failures caused by information asymmetry by shifting the focal investment activities of the crowd from startups to lead investors. Syndicates align the incentives of issuers, lead investors, and follow-on investors by providing incentives for lead investors to conduct due diligence, monitor progress, and exploit their reputation. Preliminary evidence foreshadows a meaningful role for syndicates in the allocation of capital to early-stage ventures.